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Abstract
Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to inﬂuence the
outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We
consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth.
We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed
wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a
democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such
a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and
repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.
Keywords: vote-buying, political economy, poverty traps, economic develop-
ment, voting rules, repeated voting
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Various studies suggest that vote-buying is an instrument widely used by parties in
developing countries to inﬂuence the outcome of elections.1 For example, buying votes
has a long tradition in countries like Mexico, the Philippines, Senegal, Taiwan or Thai-
land. In the 2002 (community-level) elections in the Philippines, an estimated 3 million
people were oﬀered some form of payment. This corresponds to about 7 percent of all
adults allowed to vote. In Thailand, 30 percent of the heads of households surveyed
in a national sample said that they had been oﬀered money during the 1996 general
election. In Taiwan’s 1999 election, 27 percent of a random sample of voters reported
that they had accepted cash oﬀers during previous electoral campaigns.2
However, if vote-buying exists, then the success of redistribution policies used to over-
come poverty may be endangered. Vote-buying may be bad for society and may in
particular prevent growth-promoting redistribution policies. There is both theoretical
and empirical evidence supporting this view. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that
in vote markets, minority groups – for example the poor – are likely to face higher trans-
action costs than others, and may therefore become victims of income redistribution.
Aghion and Bolton (2003) formalize the fear expressed by Schelling (1960) that vote
trading tends to increase the scope of the expropriation of voters. Barro (2000) and
Docquier and Tarbalouti (2001) analyze the potential eﬀects of vote-buying on redistri-
bution in developing countries, with special reference to economic growth. They argue
that some (rich) groups may have an incentive to buy votes in order to prevent redis-
tribution. Their main result is that vote-buying is likely to reduce growth-promoting
redistribution.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze whether vote-buying can
explain the fact why democratic societies in many developing countries have been
caught in a poverty trap. This is a positive analysis. We use a simple political economy
model in which societies vote on growth-promoting redistribution, and combine it with
the vote-buying model developed by Groseclose and Snyder (1996).3 We show that
growth-promoting redistribution is impossible, as people burdened by taxes would buy
votes of poor people, and consequently, poverty persists.
1In the literature, diﬀerent notions of “vote-buying” are discussed. For an overview see, for example,
Schaﬀer (2006). In this paper, vote-buying is seen as a purely economic exchange where votes are
traded for cash, for example.
2See, for example, Hicken (2002), Rigger (2002), and Schaﬀer (2004).
3The model has recently been generalized by Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008), who allow for
a sequential and alternating bidding process over multiple rounds.
2Second, as a normative analysis, we suggest a set of constitutional rules that enable
a society to break the negative consequences of vote-buying. Such rules must balance
three requirements: proposals for growth-promoting redistributions must be made, such
proposals must be approved by a majority and rich people must be protected from ex-
cessive taxation, as well as from the threat to become poor. A democratic constitution
that fulﬁlls these requirements and thus promotes growth is called a growth-promoting
constitution. Our main result is that such a growth-promoting constitution exists.
It consists of a repeated-voting rule, a rotating agenda-setting rule and a taxpayer-
protection rule.
Repeated voting on the same proposal helps a society to break the negative conse-
quences of vote buying. The main intuition runs as follows: Under repeated voting,
a proposal that has been rejected will be brought to vote again. This procedure can
be repeated a ﬁxed number of times. Once the proposal is accepted, the process ends
immediately. Such a repetition of the voting on a single proposal makes vote-buying
prohibitively costly, as the buyers of votes have to pay for votes in each period.
In order to promote growth, the repeated-voting rule will be combined with rotating
agenda-setting, ensuring that growth-promoting redistribution proposals are made, and
with a taxpayer-protection rule guaranteeing that richer people do not slide back into
poverty.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we outline the related literature.
The basic model is presented in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the policy necessary
to overcome a poverty trap. In section 5 we present the vote-buying model and we
outline the political framework. In section 6 we show that if vote-buying is possible,
overcoming a poverty trap is not possible. In section 7 we introduce repeated voting
and show that a growth-promoting constitution exists under vote-buying. Section 8
concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
This paper is related to two diﬀerent strands of the literature. First, there is a large
literature dealing with the existence and persistence of poverty traps. Our focus on
human capital and redistribution in a model with a poverty trap starts from the seminal
contribution of Galor and Zeira (1993) (see also the important contribution of Azariadis
3(1996) and the survey of Azariadis and Stachurski (2005)). Additionally, poverty traps
are often connected with child labor, because poverty often means that children have to
work to supplement the family’s income. There is also a large literature on this subject.
For an overview, see Basu and Tzannatos (2003) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2001).
Second, this paper refers to the constructive constitutional economics approach which
goes back to Buchanan and Tullock (1962). This approach deals with the design of new
constitutional rules that might be helpful in democratic decision-making. Recent pa-
pers on constitutional design focus on optimal majority rules in the context of reforms
and public goods provision.4 In this paper, we examine how democratic rules, such as
a taxpayer-protection rule and a repeated voting rule, can help to ensure that propos-
als for growth-promoting redistributions are made, such proposals are approved by a
majority and rich people are protected from excessive taxation and from the threat to
become poor. In the concluding section we comment on how such constitutions might
be implemented.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Output Production and Human Capital Formation
We consider an OLG model in which individuals live for two periods and where human
capital accumulation is a major source of economic growth. These periods are labeled
childhood and adulthood, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that each household
comprises one adult and one child. We consider a society Ω = {1,...,n} consisting of
n > 3 households, where n is assumed to be odd.5 A generic household is indexed by
i. In the basic model, all households are alike and we drop the index.
We now turn to output production and consider an aggregate consumption good. For
simplicity, let us assume that the human capital of adults is the only input factor
needed for production and that all output will accrue to the households as income. We
use λt ∈ [1,∞) to denote the human capital of an adult in period t. The condition
λ = 1 for the society as a whole can be thought of as a state of backwardness. The
level of output in period t produced by an adult who has a human capital endowment
4See, for example, Aghion and Bolton (2003), Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), and Gersbach
(2004).
5This assumption is not essential, but it simpliﬁes our analysis, as it eliminates the possibility of
a draw.
4of λt is given by
yt = αλt, (1)
where α ∈ (0,∞) denotes the marginal productivity of human capital.
We now turn to the formation of human capital. We assume that in period t adults
can make educational investments, i.e. they can use part of their income to invest
in the human capital of their children. We use et ∈ [0,∞] to denote the educational
investments of an adult in period t. These costs can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways.
For instance, they may be the direct costs of school attendance. If school attendance
is free of charge they may represent foregone income, as schooling may reduce the time
children can contribute in household production. The child’s human capital endowment
on reaching adulthood at time t + 1 is given by
λt+1 = h(et) + 1. (2)
The function h(·) represents the human capital technology. h(·) is assumed to be a
continuous, strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable function in et, where h(0) = 0, i.e. no
investments in education, lead to a human capital level amounting to 1. Equation (2)
implies that educational investments are necessary for the formation of human capital
in the next generation, i.e., for λt+1 > 1.
3.2 The Household’s Behavior
We assume that all allocative decisions lie in the adult’s hands. We rule out any
bequests and the possibility of debts, so that (1) is the current real income used entirely
for consumption,6 denoted by ct, and educational investments et. The family’s budget
constraint is given by
ct + et ≤ yt. (3)
Adults are assumed to be altruistic, i.e. they want to maximize current consumption
and educational investments for their children. Let the adult’s preference ordering
be representable by the continuous, strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable, strictly quasi-
6Consumption includes the consumption of the adult and of the child which is often viewed as a
ﬁxed fraction of the adult’s consumption.




ct + et ≤ αλt (4)
et, ct ≥ 0.
In view of the assumptions on u(·), this problem has a unique solution, denoted by
(co (λt),eo (λt)), which is continuous in λt.
We make the following two assumptions regarding the optimal choices of (co (λt),eo (λt)):
• Altruism is only operative if the human capital of adults is suﬃciently large.
Therefore, we assume that there exists a critical value λS > 1 such that
e
o (λt) = 0 ∀ λt ≤ λ
S,
e
o (λt) > 0 ∀ λt > λ
S.
(5)
• Both goods are non-inferior, i.e.
∂co (λt)
∂λt
> 0 ∀ λt ≥ 1,
∂eo (λt)
∂λt
> 0 ∀ λt > λ
S.
(6)
A typical example that satisﬁes both assumptions are Stone-Geary preferences, which
are widely used in development economics (see, e.g., Basu and Van (1998) and Bell




et if ct ≥ cS
ct − cS otherwise,
where cS is the critical consumption level above which adults are motivated to invest
in schooling. Hence, λS = cS
α . It is readily veriﬁed that condition (6) holds.
3.3 Dynamics
Returning to (2) in the light of (5), we obtain
λt+1 =
(
1 ∀λt ≤ λS























Figure 1: Human capital formation
In view of the assumption that λS > 1, it follows from the ﬁrst part of (7) that the
state of backwardness (λ = 1 for the society as whole) is a locally stable steady state.
Henceforth, we will refer to this steady state as the poverty trap.











which is strictly positive, as
∂h(eo(λt))
∂eo(λt) > 0 and
∂eo(λt)
∂λt > 0 for all λt > λS.














λ∗ is a second stationary level of human capital, where adults and their oﬀspring share
the same level of human capital. Note that λ∗ is an unstable steady state. The dynamic
of our model is shown in Figure 1.
7Figure 1 illustrates how long-term growth depends on the size of educational invest-
ments made by the adults, which, in turn, depends on their human capital level. For
example, if the educational investments eo
t (λ) of the adults in period t are not suﬃ-
ciently large, i.e. eo
t (λ) < eo (λ∗), then the human capital of these children and their
oﬀspring will be smaller than λ∗ in subsequent periods, and subsequent generations
will fall back into the poverty trap. However, if the adults choose eo
t (λ) > eo (λ∗),
then the human capital of these adults’ descendants in the subsequent periods will be
greater than λ∗ and human capital will grow in subsequent periods.
In short, overcoming the poverty trap requires that uneducated individuals have to be
given suﬃcient support for the adults to be able to choose eo (λt) > eo (λ∗). In the
following, we will call an individual educated if his human capital is larger than λ∗,
i.e. if he will aﬀord schooling for his oﬀspring, that yields increasing human capital
and output. Moreover, we will call a society educated if all its members have human
capital larger than λ∗.
It is important to stress that growth-promoting redistribution is optimal for the society
from a utilitarian perspective taking into account all generations if future generations
have a suﬃciently high weight, i.e. the discount factor is not too low. This justiﬁcation
rests on the following externality: The improvements in all future generations welfare
that stem from a better education of today’s children are not fully reﬂected in the
preferences of today’s parents. This hold, as parents care about their children’s edu-
cation, but not about what happens subsequently. If, as arguable, the social planner
has a longer time-horizon than individual households, then the case for redistribution
to promote schooling is, in principle, established (cf. Bell and Gersbach (2008)).
4 Redistribution to Overcome Poverty




0 = 1 ∀i ∈ Ω,
8which represents a worst-case scenario.7 The broad policy objective is to educate the
whole society in order to enable all its members to escape from this backwardness, i.e.
λ
i > λ
∗ ∀i ∈ Ω.
The instruments for this purpose are taxation and subsidization. Let τi
t denote the tax
levied on the income of household i in period t. At the beginning of each period t, some
individuals will be subsidized from the ensuing tax revenue. We use si
t to denote the
subsidy each household i will receive in period t. We suppose that households are either
taxed or subsidized. Since households in a state of backwardness have few resources,
we assume that there is a subsistence level csub for an adult-child household that must
be guaranteed under all circumstances. The taxation of a household i caught in the









t ≤ α − c
sub =: τ
sub
Next, we assume that τsub > 0. It is plausible for τsub to be small, as households caught
in the poverty trap may already be close to the subsistence level csub.
We deﬁne s∗ as the subsidy a household that is in a state of backwardness needs to
achieve a human capital level of λ∗ in the subsequent period. Hence, s∗ is given by the
implicit equation
h(e
o (α + s
∗)) + 1 = λ
∗.
In order to overcome the poverty trap permanently, uneducated individuals have to
be given suﬃcient support for educational investments that yield increasing human
capital. Accordingly, we deﬁne s as the subsidy a household in a state of backwardness
needs to achieve a human capital level larger than λ∗ in the subsequent period. Hence,
s is given by the equation
s = s
∗ + ²,
where ² is arbitrarily small, but positive.
7Note that in reality, income distribution in developing countries is typically unequal. In the
following sections, we show that our results also hold true if we assume that there initially exists a
minority of “educated” rich households.
9We now look at households that have received subsidies of at least s, i.e. λi
t > λ∗. If
taxation of such households is very high, education of the oﬀspring will be low and






t ≥ α + s,









− s =: τ
∗
The total government revenues in period t are denoted by Bt. The budget constraint












Throughout the paper, we assume that n−1
2 τsub ≥ s. That is, the taxation of (n−1)/2
uneducated households is suﬃcient to subsidize at least one uneducated household with
s.
5 The Vote-buying Game
5.1 The Game Form
In the following, we consider the case where individuals who will be taxed if the proposal
is implemented (henceforth called taxpayers) may engage in up-front vote-buying. Up-
front vote-buying is a binding agreement that gives an individual full control of the
vote of another individual in exchange for an up-front payment.
We assume that vote-buying is legally forbidden, but the agenda setter cannot observe
which individuals are purchased and which are not. This implies that vote buyers and
sellers face no risk of punishment. Since the agenda setter is aware of vote-buying, he
may have an incentive to make a proposal which includes subsidy payments to untaxed
individuals, to make vote-buying expensive.
We consider the possibility of taxpayers forming a coalition to prevent the adoption of a
redistribution proposal by vote-buying. For simplicity, we assume that each taxpayer in
the coalition will have the same bargaining power, i.e. if the taxpayers form a coalition
to engage in vote-buying, each taxpayer has to pay the same amount. Moreover, we
assume that the coalition of taxpayers can monitor the casting of votes by the purchased
10individuals and can prevent deviations. In reality, there are several strategies for the
vote buyers to generate and enforce compliance.8 For example, vote buyers can instruct
voters to fold the ballot in a distinctive way, or to put a pinhole in one corner of
the ballot such that vote buyers can easily verify whether the voters have voted as
instructed. Another way is to give a voter a fake or stolen pre-marked ballot before
entering the polling station. The voter casts the ﬁlled-in ballot and gives the oﬃcial
blank ballot to another voter waiting outside. This voter ﬁlls out the (received) ballot
to the buyer’s satisfaction, and goes back into the polling station and repeats the
process. Another common practice is to pay voters to abstain from voting, thereby
preventing them from casting ballots for the opponent.
We apply the vote-buying game developed by Groseclose and Snyder (1996). We
consider a sequential game with the agenda setter moving ﬁrst and the coalition of
taxpayers moving last. This assumption could be justiﬁed with the observation that
the payments for votes by the agenda setter are part of his proposal and if it is costly
to change proposals – which we will assume in the following – then the coalition of
taxpayers is indeed able to move last.
We now turn to the sequence of the vote-buying game. The timing of events in period
t can be summarized as follows:
1. An individual is randomly chosen to set the agenda. The agenda setter either
announces a redistribution proposal or makes no proposal.
2. If the agenda setter announces a proposal, then
(i) the taxpayers can form a coalition and decide on the basis of this proposal
whether or not to buy votes;
(ii) vote-buying does or does not take place;
(iii) the society holds a vote on the implementation of the proposal;
(iv) the proposal is adopted if it receives more votes than required by some voting
rule.
The status quo will prevail if the agenda setter makes no proposal or if a redistribution
proposal is not adopted. At the vote-buying stage, individuals know who will be taxed
and who will receive subsidies if a proposal is accepted. In particular, at this point
8Schaﬀer (2006) gives a description of a number of strategies available to vote buyers to generate
and enforce compliance.
11in time, the coalition of taxpayers is perfectly informed about the oﬀers made by the
agenda setter.
5.2 Constitutional Rules
In this section, we explore the capacity of democratic constitutions to promote growth.
Such a constitution is a set of rules that specify how the agenda setter is chosen and
how decisions are taken. In order to give democracy a good chance to overcome poverty,
we introduce the following set of rules:9
The democratic agenda-setting process is speciﬁed as follows:
• Rotating agenda setting (RoA): The agenda setter is selected randomly.10 In the
ﬁrst period, each individual i has the opportunity to make a proposal. In the
subsequent periods, only individuals who have not set the agenda in previous pe-
riods can apply for agenda setting. Each individual i allowed to make a proposal
has the same chance of setting the agenda.
This rule implies that the number of permitted reelections is zero. It ensures that each
individual will be the agenda setter at some point in time and will therefore have the
chance to make an education-enhancing redistribution proposal on which the society
will hold a vote.
Moreover, we assume that a proposal has to satisfy the following agenda rule:










t = 0, ∀t.
By requiring a balanced budget in each period, the possibility of capital market-
ﬁnanced subsidies for education is excluded. Thus, we analyze a worst-case scenario
in the following. Obviously, a society that can be educated without access to capital
markets can also be educated if it has access to them.
9Indeed, Gersbach and Siemers (2005) show that without vote-buying the set of rules introduced
in this subsection induce education-promoting redistribution and growth.
10Random selection is widely used in the literature on political science and political economy (see
for example, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Mueller, Tollison, and Willet (1972)), and it is commonly
seen as a decision rule generally accepted by individuals.
12As a decision rule, we use a variant of the ﬂexible majority rules (see, e.g. Gersbach
(2004)) in order to limit the taxation of educated households, so that they do not fall













: Under this rule, the share of
votes needed to implement a proposal, denoted by m(τmax
t ,τ), jumps from 1
2
(simple majority) to 1 (unanimity) if any individual i is taxed higher than the












The ﬂexible majority rule eﬀectively operates as tax protection rules. It ensures that
a winning majority for the proposal can be obtained if and only if educated adults
are not taxed adversely, i.e. if τmax
t ≤ τ. As soon as an agenda setter suggests an
adverse tax scheme, i.e. τmax
t > τ, the constitution requires unanimous agreement,
which, de facto, makes expropriation impossible to implement. A particular form for
m of such threshold ﬂexible majority rules is to set τ = min{τsub,τ∗}. Recall that
τsub is the highest taxation allowed for households in a state of backwardness, while τ∗
is the highest tax burden for an already-subsidized household that does not endanger
educational investments in the future. Hence, the minimum of τsub and τ∗ ensures
that uneducated households will not fall below the subsistence level, and educated
households will not fall back into the poverty trap.
5.3 Equilibrium Concept
Given the constitutional rules described in subsection 5.2, we will look at subgame-
perfect equilibria in the vote buying game. It is convenient to introduce the following
tie-breaking rule for agenda setting. We assume
• TR 1: Individual i will apply for agenda setting if and only if he can strictly
improve his utility by agenda setting.
That is, the agenda setter expects that he can make a proposal with s
ag
t > 0 that will
be adopted. Alternatively, we can assume that there are small, but positive ﬁxed costs
for agenda setting.
135.4 Voting Behavior of Unbribed Individuals
In this subsection, we examine the voting behavior of unbribed individuals. Recall that
we have assumed that a proposal either levies taxes on individuals (including a zero
tax rate), or provides subsidies. Obviously, taxpayers will vote against the proposal,
whereas subsidized individuals who have not been bribed will support it. If an unbribed
individual i is neither taxed nor subsidized, then he is indiﬀerent between supporting
and rejecting the proposal. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume






5.5 Incentives to Buy and Sell Votes
In the next step, we examine the incentives to buy and sell votes. The incentive of the
coalition of taxpayers to buy votes depends on whether the agenda setter proposes an
adverse tax scheme or not. If the tax scheme satisﬁes τmax
t > τ, then unanimity rule
prevails. In this case, there is no need for the taxpayers to engage in vote-buying, as
each individual has the power to vote a proposal down.
If the agenda setter suggests a tax scheme with τmax
t ≤ τ, the simple majority rule
prevails. Given this situation, the agenda setter and the coalition of taxpayers will be
interested in obtaining a majority of votes for and against the proposal respectively,
while spending as little as possible. That is, they will compete for the votes of the
individuals who will not be taxed if the proposal is accepted. We now turn to the
payment promises made by the agenda setter and by the coalition of taxpayers to the
untaxed individuals. We deﬁne
NT = {i ∈ Ω |τ
i
t = 0 ∧ i 6= ag}
as the set of untaxed individuals in which the agenda setter is not included. Let si
t
denote the oﬀer from the agenda setter to the untaxed individual i ∈ NT, and let
pi
t denote the payment oﬀer of the coalition of taxpayers to the untaxed individual
i ∈ NT.
Both the agenda setter and the coalition of taxpayers have an incentive to bribe untaxed
individuals if and only if, the expected tax revenues Bt, are at least as high as their
total payment promises to the untaxed individuals. If this is not the case, vote-buying
14will not occur. Alternatively, Bt can be interpreted as the budget or the willingness
to pay for implementing and preventing the proposal, on the part of the agenda setter
and the coalition of taxpayers, respectively.
The incentives of these individuals can be formalized as follows:


















The preference of both the agenda setter and the coalition of taxpayers is to win at
minimal cost. In equilibrium, the agenda setter’s winning utility is
s
ag






and his losing utility is zero, where s
ag




the total of all payments incurred by the agenda setter (including zero subsidies to some
of the untaxed individuals). By contrast, in equilibrium, the utility from winning for
the coalition of taxpayers amounts to −
P
i∈NT pi




t is the total of all payments incurred by the coalition (including zero-







is the value from winning if the majority votes against the proposal in equilibrium.
Note that the coalition of taxpayers will only engage in vote-buying if it knows that it
will win in equilibrium. Otherwise, the coalition will not buy any votes, as the money
would be wasted.
We now regard the untaxed individuals, who may have incentives to sell their votes to
the coalition of taxpayers. As vote-buying is illegal, we assume that there are positive
moral costs of vote-selling, denoted by φ.11 A bribed individual i will support the
11Alternatively, we can drop the assumption that the risk for vote sellers to be arrested and punished
is zero, and assume instead that there is a small, but positive probability that the agenda setter can
observe which individuals have been bought by the coalition of taxpayers. In this case, φ could also be
interpreted as a risk premium demanded by the vote sellers to compensate the risk of being arrested
and punished.
15proposal if si
t + φ > pi
t and reject it if si
t + φ < pi
t. If si
t + φ = pi
t, then the bribed
individual i will be indiﬀerent between supporting and rejecting the proposal. As a
tie-breaking rule, we assume
• TR 3: A bribed individual i will sell his vote to the coalition of taxpayers if
s
i
t + φ = p
i
t.
6 The Impossibility Result
In this section, we examine the outcome of the entire game with constitutional rules
as set out in subsection 5.2 and the tie-breaking rules TR 1 – TR 3. We use T to
denote the number of periods a democratic society needs to educate itself. Recall our
assumption that initially (t = 0), the whole society is in a state of backwardness, i.e.
λi
0 = 1 ∀i ∈ Ω. If vote-buying is possible, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1
Consider the case of a democracy with a constitution that provides for:
• rotating agenda setting (RoA)12
• threshold ﬂexible majority rule (TFM[τmax
t ,τ]), with τ = min{τsub,τ∗}
• balanced budget (BB)
Such a democracy cannot educate a society in ﬁnite time, i.e. T = ∞, if vote-buying
is possible and if the moral costs of vote-selling are suﬃciently small, that is, if
φ <
(n − 3)τsub
(n − 1)(n − 2)
.
The proof is given in the appendix.
The reason for the result of Proposition 1 is the following: Suppose that the randomly-
chosen agenda setter in t = 0 makes a proposal where he taxes at most (n − 1)/2
individuals with τsub to subsidize himself and other untaxed individuals. As the agenda
setter knows that the taxpayers can form a coalition after he has announced a proposal
and buy the “cheapest” untaxed individuals of his proposal, the best thing he can do
is to make a proposal with equal subsidies to all untaxed individuals. By contrast, the
12If there is a dynasty that holds the agenda setting power, a society has a priori no possibility to
overcome the poverty trap, as is evident from the proof of Proposition 1.
16coalition of taxpayers has the advantage of buying only a small number of untaxed
individuals to form a simple majority against the proposal, as all taxpayers will vote
against the proposal. Moreover, it is suﬃcient to oﬀer these individuals slightly more
than the subsidies of the agenda setter and the moral costs of vote-selling together
to win their votes. If the moral costs of vote-selling are not too large, then vote-
buying is always proﬁtable for the coalition of taxpayers. This, in turn, implies that
no proposal made by the agenda setter would ever be accepted, because a majority
would always vote against it. Since the agenda setter expects that he cannot strictly
improve his utility by agenda setting, he will refuse to make a proposal. The preceding
argumentation holds true for every period t. Hence, the education of a society is not
possible in ﬁnite time, and the economy remains in a state of backwardness.
The result of Proposition 1 also applies to societies where a share of individuals is
already educated.
Corollary 1
Consider a society where some individuals are already educated, i.e. λ0 > λ∗ holds
for these individuals. A constitution with RoA, BB, and TFM cannot educate such a
society in ﬁnite time if the moral costs of vote-selling are suﬃciently small.
The proof of this statement follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 8 and is
therefore omitted.
Corollary 1 states that the failure in the education of a society does not depend on
the fact that the whole society is initially in the poverty trap. The reason for this
result is the following: If some individuals are already rich and educated, the size of
the expected tax burden may change. A change in the expected tax burden, however,
aﬀects the vote-buying budget of the agenda setter and of the coalition of taxpayers in
the same way. As the coalition of taxpayers will make its payment oﬀers to the poor
untaxed individuals after the agenda setter has announced his proposal, the advantage
of buying only a small number of untaxed individuals remains. Hence, the coalition of
taxpayers is still able to bid in such a way that the proposal of the agenda setter will
be rejected, as long as the moral costs of vote-selling are suﬃciently small.
177 Repeated Voting
To eliminate the negative impact of vote-buying, we introduce repeated voting.13 The
additional agenda rule is described as follows:
• Repetition of Voting (RoV[R]): If the proposal of an agenda setter i is rejected,
the voting on that proposal will be repeated. A vote will be repeated R times.
If the proposal is accepted, voting ends. However, if the proposal is rejected R
times, the status quo prevails.
We now describe the sequence in period t in more detail. At the beginning of period
t, the agenda setter is allowed to make a proposal. In the next stage, the society holds
a vote on the implementation of this proposal. If a majority votes in favor of the
proposal, it is accepted. Otherwise, there will be a new vote on this one. If the project
is rejected again, then there will be a yet another vote on this subject. This procedure
will be repeated as long as the proposal is not accepted. However, repetition of voting
stops if the proposal is rejected R times. In this case, the status quo will prevail. If
the buying of votes is possible, we obtain
Proposition 2
Consider the case of a democracy with constitution that provides for:
• rotating agenda setting (RoA)
• threshold ﬂexible majority rule (TFM[τmax
t ,τ]) with τ = min{τsub,τ∗}
• balanced budget (BB)
• repetition of voting (RoV[R])






, φ > 0.
Such a democracy can educate a society in ﬁnite time, i.e., T < ∞, if vote-buying is
possible.
13We will use repeated voting to break the blockade against education-enhancing proposals induced
by vote-buying. Repeated voting may also have other virtues. For example, Morton (1988) has shown
that agents can acquire information on voter preferences by observing the results of early referenda and
use that information in formulating a strategy for subsequent referenda. Repeated voting is actually
applied in practice. For instance, the possibility of repeated referenda is allowed in the constitutions
of the Republic of Tajikistan (1995) or of Slovakia (1992) (see, e.g., Article 31 of the Constitutional
Law of Republic of Tajikistan on a Referendum, or Article 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Slovakia).
18Note that dR∗e denotes the minimal natural number larger than or equal to R∗. The
proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix.
The reason for the result of Proposition 2 is the following: Suppose that the randomly-
chosen agenda setter in t = 0 makes a proposal where he taxes at most (n − 1)/2
individuals with τsub to subsidize himself with s. The possibility of repeated voting
makes vote-buying prohibitively costly, as the coalition of taxpayers has to buy at
least one untaxed individual in each voting to form a minimal coalition against the
proposal. If the number of possible voting repetitions is suﬃciently large, then vote-
buying would not be proﬁtable for the coalition of taxpayers, since the total payments
needed to prevent the implementation of the proposal would outweigh tax demand in
the ﬁrst round. Hence, it is optimal for the coalition of taxpayers not to engage in vote
buying in the ﬁrst round. According to TR 2, all untaxed individuals will vote in favor
of the proposal in the ﬁrst vote, which implies that the proposal of the agenda setter
will be accepted. The rotating agenda-setting rule ensures that each poor individual
will have the right to set the agenda in the future, which implies that all individuals
will receive the required transfer s. The threshold ﬂexible majority rule guarantees that
educated rich people are not excessively taxed and become poor. Hence, a constitution
consisting of RoV, RoA and TFM promotes growth. As a result, the society will be
educated in ﬁnite time.
However, it is clear that RoV will only work if repeated voting actually reduces the
wealth of the vote buyer. The success of a constitution consisting of RoV, RoA and
TFM might conceivably be endangered by “long-term vote-buying contracts”. A long-
term vote-buying contract is a binding agreement that gives the vote buyer full control
of the vote of another individual for more than one vote, in exchange for an up-front
payment. However, we believe that in reality, long-term vote-buying contracts are not
feasible. The reason is that vote-buying contracts are illegal, therefore they cannot be
enforced by courts.
In our analysis, we have considered a society where the moral costs of vote-selling are
relatively small, where vote buyers and sellers face no risk of punishment, and where
vote buyers can monitor the casting of the votes they bought perfectly. These features
tend to apply to many developing countries. If we considered a society where, for
example, the risk of being punished is very high or where the moral costs of vote-
selling are large, vote-buying would be prohibitively costly and thus less attractive.
This tends to hold for industrial countries.
198 Conclusions
This paper has provided two insights. First, we have shown that if agents can trade
votes, and if the moral costs of vote-selling are not too large, the education of a demo-
cratic society is impossible. Hence, this society will remain in the poverty trap. This
pessimistic result is due to the fact that the potential losers from redistribution have
strong incentives to buy votes to prevent redistribution. This impossibility result may
provide one possible explanation as to why many developing countries have been caught
in the poverty trap for such a long time.
Second, we have shown that a constitution consisting of a repeated voting rule, a
rotating agenda-setting rule and a threshold ﬂexible majority rule enables a society
to escape the poverty trap if vote-buying is possible, as the opportunity of repeated
voting makes vote-buying prohibitively costly, and therefore unattractive for the tax-
payers. The threshold ﬂexible majority rule guarantees that rich people are not taxed
excessively, which would impoverish them. Rotating agenda-setting ensures that each
individual will have his turn in agenda-setting and will receive his growth-promoting
transfers.
Numerous issues deserve further scrutiny. For instance, it is important to look into the
opportunities to introduce a growth-promoting constitution. While, in principle, the
standard “veil of ignorance” argument could be used, in overlapping generation models,
it may be sensible to use the requirement that the current generation of adults must
support a new constitution. In such circumstances, delayed implementation could be
used, which works as follows.14 Consider a proposal to introduce the growth-promoting
constitution, coupled with the requirement that the constitution can only be abolished
by a qualiﬁed majority. Moreover, suppose that if accepted, the constitution would
become eﬀective only after a delay – after the old generation has died. Then, as long as
the current generation of adults is minimally and equally concerned15 about the well-
being of its children and grand-children, the current generation of adults will favor the
proposal. The high majority hurdle for its abolishment would ensure that the rule will
not be eliminated once it has been introduced.
14Delayed implementation is a common practice. An example has recently taken place in Germany,
where the increase of the oﬃcial retirement age from 65 to 67 will become eﬀective only after the
current old generation has retired (See Deutscher Bundestag, 2006).
15It suﬃces that there is a very small level of altruism.
20Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
In the following, we show that there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
voting buying game with constitutional rules TFM, RoA and BB and the tie-breaking
rules TR 1 – TR 3 in which the randomly chosen agenda setter makes no redistribution
proposal if the moral costs of vote-selling are suﬃciently low.
In order to prove the result, we proceed in three steps. In the ﬁrst and in the second
step, we examine the second stage of the voting game, i.e. the subgame that follows if
the agenda setter has made a proposal in the ﬁrst stage. In the third step, we consider
the ﬁrst stage of the voting game. We use the results of step 1 and 2 to identify the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the entire game in step 3.
Step 1:
Consider a proposal where the agenda setter taxes at most (n−1)/2 individuals and he
uses a part of the tax revenues Bt to subsidize himself (s
ag
t > 0) and the remaining part
of the tax revenues (Bt−s
ag
t ) to subsidize untaxed individuals to form a coalition which
supports his proposal. In the following, we will use T (0 < T ≤ n−1
2 ) to denote the
number of taxed individuals and S to denote the number of untaxed individuals which
receive positive subsidies. Accordingly, the maximal number of untaxed individuals
which the agenda setter can subsidize amounts to n − 1 − T , i.e. 0 ≤ S ≤ n − 1 − T .
Recall that the taxpayers will form a coalition and bribe the n+1
2 − T least expensive
untaxed individuals if condition VB(2) holds. To make vote-buying most expensive and
thus least attractive for coalition of taxpayers, we consider proposals where the agenda
setter makes equal subsidies to all individuals he subsidizes. That is, all subsidized





We now show that the total bribes of the coalition of taxpayers needed to defend the
proposal of the agenda setter are maximal, if the agenda setter makes a proposal with
equal subsidies for all n − 1 − T untaxed individuals.
If 0 ≤ S ≤ n−3
2 , then, according to TR 3, the coalition of taxpayers can defeat the
proposal of the agenda setter by paying φ to n+1
2 −T non-subsidized individuals. The
21total bribes of the coalition of taxpayers, denoted by P, for S ≤ n−3









2 < S ≤ n − 1 − T , then, according to TR 3, the coalition of taxpayers has to
pay st + φ to S − n−3
2 subsidized individuals and φ to the remaining n − 1 − T − S
non-subsidized individuals to form a least expensive majority against the proposal.
The total bribes of the coalition of taxpayers for S > n−3
2 are given by




























S for each subsidized individual. Comparing
(9) with (10) yields that the total bribes for the coalition of taxpayers are larger if
n−3
2 < S. Moreover, analyzing (10) yields that total bribes for the coalition of taxpayers
are maximal if S = n − 1 − T , as P is strictly increasing in S.
Step 2:
In the second step, we show that, given the moral costs of vote-selling are suﬃciently
low, it is always proﬁtable for the coalition of taxpayers to engage in vote-buying, even
if the agenda setter makes a proposal with equal subsidies to all n − 1 − T untaxed
individuals.
For S = n − 1 − T , the total bribes of the coalition of taxpayers are given by















Note that initially all individuals are caught in the poverty trap (λi
0 = 1 ∀i ∈ Ω).
According to TFM, τsub is the highest taxation allowed for households in a state of
backwardness. Hence, the expected total tax revenue for the agenda setter is given by
Bt = T τ
sub. (12)
We now examine the conditions under which the taxpayers will form a coalition and
engage in vote-buying. According to VB(2), taxpayers will form a coalition and buy
votes if the gain of vote-buying, which is given by
















22is weakly positive. The expression in (13) is weakly positive, if the moral costs of
vote-selling, φ, are suﬃciently small, i.e. if the following condition holds true:
φ ≤
(n − 3)T τsub + (n + 1 − 2T )s
ag
t
(n + 1 − 2T )(n − 1 − T )
(14)
Note that we have assumed that n > 3 and 0 < T ≤ n−1
2 . Now suppose that the
subsidies for the agenda setter are arbitrarily small but positive. Formally, for s
ag
t → 0,
(n − 3)T τsub + (n + 1 − 2T )s
ag
t
(n + 1 − 2T )(n − 1 − T )
converges to
φ(T ) =
(n − 3)T τsub




(n − 3)T τsub + (n + 1 − 2T )s
ag
t
(n + 1 − 2T )(n − 1 − T )
for every s
ag
t > 0. So condition (14) is fulﬁlled if φ ≤ φ(T ) for every s
ag
t > 0. Also note
that φ(T ) is increasing in T . That is, for T = 1 and n > 3, we obtain
φ(1) =
(n − 3)τsub
(n − 1)(n − 2)
> 0.
If φ ≤ φ(1) holds true, then the potential gain from vote-buying for the coalition of
taxpayers is positive for every T ∈ [1,(n−1)/2] and every s
ag
t > 0. Thus, it is proﬁtable
for the coalition of taxpayers to engage in vote-buying. Hence, the proposal will not
be adopted.
Step 3:
We now turn to the ﬁrst stage of the vote-buying game. According to tie-breaking
rule TR 1, the agenda setter will never apply for agenda setting, because he expects
that every proposal with s
ag
t > 0 to be rejected with certainty if the moral costs of
vote-selling are suﬃciently small. Hence, no growth-promoting redistribution occurs in
period t which implies that the human capital in the next period amounts to λi
t+1 = 1
for all individuals.
Note that the preceding argumentation holds true for every period t. Hence, the
education of a society is not possible in ﬁnite time.
2
23Proof of Proposition 2
In the following, we show that there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the voting
buying game with constitutional rules TFM, RoA, BB and RoV and the tie-breaking
rules TR 1 – TR 3 in which the agenda setter makes a growth-promoting redistribution
proposal, taxpayers do not engage in vote-buying and the proposal is accepted in the
ﬁrst vote.
To show this result, we have to proceed in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we examine
the second stage of the voting game. In particular, we derive the condition for the
number of voting repetitions where vote-buying is never proﬁtable for the coalition of
taxpayers. In the second step, we consider the optimal behavior of the agenda setter
in the ﬁrst stage of the voting game. In the third step, we show that a democracy with
TFM, RoA, BB and RoV can educate a society.
Step 1:
We will now derive the condition for the number of voting repetitions where vote-
buying is never proﬁtable for the coalition of taxpayers. The repetitions of votes are
indexed by r ∈ {0,1,...,R}. Let Bt(r) denote the total expected tax revenue in period
t if the voting is repeated r times. Let si
t(r) denote the subsidy that individual i ∈ NT
will receive from the agenda setter in period t, if the proposal is accepted after having
been rejected r times before. Correspondingly, let pi
t(r) denote the payments that
individual i ∈ NT would receive in period t from the coalition of taxpayers, if it again
votes against the proposal that has already been rejected r times before.
In the following we focus on the proposal where the agenda setter will tax (n − 1)/2
individuals and pay no subsidies to the untaxed individuals. That is, s
ag
t (r) = Bt(r)
and si
t(r) = 0 ∀i ∈ NT and ∀r ∈ {0,1,...,R}. Note that, according to TR 2, all
untaxed individuals will vote in favor of this proposal if they are not bribed by the
coalition of taxpayers, i.e. the proposal is adopted without vote-buying.
Recall that, initially, all individuals are caught in the poverty trap, λi
0 = 1 ∀i ∈ Ω.
According to TFM, τsub is the highest taxation allowed for households in a state of
backwardness. So the expected tax revenues in the ﬁrst round, i.e., when the number






24Recall that we have assumed that n−1
2 τsub ≥ s, i.e. s
ag
t (0) ≥ s.
Since the agenda setter will tax (n − 1)/2 individuals, it suﬃces for the coalition of
taxpayers to buy only one untaxed individual in order to form a minimal coalition that
will vote against the proposal, and to pay this individual
pt(r) = φ > 0
in each vote (see TR 3). In order to win the voting against the proposal R times, the
coalition of taxpayers has to pay the total amount of
R X
r=0
pt(r) = [pt (0) + pt (1) + ... + pt (R)]
= φR. (16)
We are now able to derive the number of repetitions of this proposal that will ensure
that vote-buying will not be attractive for the coalition of taxpayers. The condition




Hence, the number of repetitions R∗ where vote buying will be not proﬁtable for the
coalition of taxpayers is implicitly given by
R∗ X
r=0
pt(r) = Bt(0). (17)













Since R∗ is a positive real number, we have to use the ceiling function for R∗. The
ceiling function is denoted by dR∗e, and it denotes the minimal natural number larger
than, or equal to, R∗.
To sum up: If the voting is only repeated R < dR∗e times, then it is proﬁtable for the
coalition of taxpayers to buy votes, since
PR
r=1 pt(r) < Bt(0). However, if R ≥ dR∗e,
then it is optimal for the coalition of taxpayers not to engage in vote-buying, which
implies that the proposal will be adopted in the ﬁrst vote.
25Step 2:
We now turn to the ﬁrst stage of the vote-buying game. In this step, we examine the
optimal behavior of the agenda setter in the ﬁrst stage of the voting game. In step
1, we have seen that the proposal of the agenda setter – where he taxes (n − 1)/2
uneducated individuals with τsub to subsidize himself with at least s – will be adopted
in the ﬁrst vote, if the voting on this proposal can be repeated dR∗e times. Now we
show that no proﬁtable deviations exist for the agenda setter.
First, it is not proﬁtable for the agenda setter to make a proposal where more than
(n−1)/2 individuals are taxed. Taxing of more than (n−1)/2 individuals would imply
that the agenda setter cannot strictly improve his utility, because such a proposal would
never be accepted, as a majority would always vote against it.
Second, it is also not proﬁtable for the agenda setter to make a proposal where fewer
than (n − 1)/2 individuals are taxed. Obviously, these proposals would also be ac-
cepted. However, taxing fewer than (n − 1)/2 individuals would entail a reduction of
the subsidies for the agenda setter. Hence, taxing fewer than (n − 1)/2 individuals is
not proﬁtable for the agenda setter either.
Third, it is not proﬁtable for the agenda setter to make a proposal where he taxes
uneducated individuals with more than τsub. According to TFM, this proposal could
be prevented easily by the taxpayers without vote-buying, as the unanimity rule would
prevail in this case.
Fourth, it is not proﬁtable for the agenda setter to make a proposal where he taxes
uneducated individuals with less than τsub. Obviously, this proposal would be accepted
by a majority either. However, taxing uneducated individuals with less than τsub would
entail a reduction of the subsidies for the agenda setter.
Finally, it is not proﬁtable for the agenda setter to pay positive subsidies to the untaxed
individuals. It appears that proposals of this kind would also be accepted, since the
subsidizing of untaxed individuals would make vote-buying more costly and therefore
less attractive for the coalition of taxpayers. However, subsidizing untaxed individuals
would also lead to lower subsidies for the agenda setter. Hence, subsidizing of untaxed
individuals is not proﬁtable for the agenda setter either.
26Step 3:
In steps 1-2, we have shown that there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
voting buying game with constitutional rules TFM, RoA, BB and RoV and the tie-
breaking rules TR 1 – TR 3 in which the agenda setter makes a growth-promoting
redistribution proposal, taxpayers do not engage in vote-buying and the proposal is
accepted in the ﬁrst vote. We now show that such a democracy can educate a society.
Because of the rotating agenda setting rule (RoA), each individual will have the right
to set the agenda. RoV ensures that vote-buying will not occur which implies that
each individual will receive the required transfer s. The threshold ﬂexible majority
rule, TFM[τmax
t ,τ], with τ = min{τsub,τ∗}, ensures both that uneducated households
will not fall below the subsistence level and that educated households will not fall back
into the poverty trap. Hence, the education achieved in the period of transfer yields
a human capital amounting to λ > λ∗ in the next and in the following periods, which
implies that the society will be educated in T < ∞.
2
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